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The First, Amendment mandates that "Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech."' But in spite of the unequivocal
words "no law,"' Congress as well as the states, which are subject to
First Amendment prohibitions through Fourteenth Amendment guar-
antees, have passed many laws abridging the freedom of certain forms
of speech, and these laws have been upheld by the courts. Forms of
speech defined as obscenity,3 incitement,4 libel,5 fraudulent asser-
tions,6 solicitation of crime,- and "fighting words" 8 have all been denied
First Amendment protection. Like these forms of expression, spee6h
defined as commercial has also been regulated or prohibited when it
did not contribute to the exchange of information and ideas, and when
the expression was likely to conflict with the interests of those who were
affected by it.
The commercial expression subject to regulation or prohibition
has included both advertising that did "no more than propose a com-
mercial transaction," 9 and nonadvertising speech that arose in a busi-
* Member, second year class.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. L
2. For a strict interpretation of these words, see Black, The Bill of Rights, 35
N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1960).
3. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Ginzburg v. United States, 383
U.S. 463 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
4. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353 (1937); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
5. E.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
6. E.g., Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178 (1948).
7. E.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Fox v.
Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
8. E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
9. E.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
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ness context, such as credit reports10 and communications with inves-
tors. 1 Such expression was explicitly denied full First Amendment
protection in 1942, when a unanimous Supreme Court in Valentine v.
Chrestensen'2 created the commercial speech doctrine by distinguish-
ing between the protections accorded to commercial and to noncom-
mercial speech:
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places
for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and
disseminating opinion and that, though the states and municipalities
may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they
may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public
thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising.' 3
Subsequent decisions by the Court have shown that the principle
announced in Chrestensen was not so much a doctrine, with all the
inflexibility that word implies, as it was a distinction that allowed
greater regulation of commercial than noncommercial speech, after a
balancing of the interests involved.
Two recent Supreme Court decisions have raised doubts about
whether that distinction may any longer be made. In 1975, in Bigelow
v. Virginia,'4 the Court held that one state could not suppress an adver-
tisement for abortion information, counseling, and referral available in
another state, leading one federal district court to conclude that "the
Chrestensen rationale was sent -to oblivion in Bigelow."' 5  The Court
in Bigelow, however, had not discarded the distinction, but rather had
concluded that the advertisement in question "contained factual mate-
rial of clear 'public interest,' " and so was not purely commercial
10. E.g., Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 415 U.S. 985 (1974); Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 898 (1971).
11. E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005 (1971); SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); Halsted v. SEC, 182 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 340 U.S. 834 (1950).
12. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
13. Id. at 54. The commercial-noncommercial distinction is not without precedent
in contexts outside the area of speech. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (legislation affecting "ordinary commercial transactions"
requires only a rational basis, while legislation affecting other interests may require
more); West Coat Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (applying only a rational-
ity test in upholding a state minimum wage law against a freedom of contract chal-
lenge).
14. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
15. Terminal-Hudson Electronics, Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 407 F.
Supp. 1075, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
16. 421 U.S. at 822.
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within the meaning of Chrestensen. But the Court may indeed have
sent the Chrestensen rationale to oblivion in 1976 when it decided Vir-
ginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.7
In a challenge by a consumer group to a statute prohibiting price adver-
tiding of prescription drugs, the Court held -that although such adver-
tising did no more than propose a commercial transaction, it was
entitled to First Amendment protection.' It is now clear that the
Constitution does place restraints on government as respects purely
commercial advertising. It is not as clear, however, to what extent the
Court will now permit any distinction to be made between commercial
and noncommercial speech in order to regulate the former without
abridging the freedom of the latter.
This note outlines the development of the commercial speech
distinction and its subsequent judicial refinement and clarification.
The discussion focuses on cases in which federal courts have employed
the distinction to protect such interests as privacy, equal protection, and
public health over the commercial interests of advertisers, while at the
same time preserving various First Amendment interests. Finally, an
analysis will be made of the Virginia Citizens case and its effect on the
constitutional status of commercial speech, particularly in relation to
interests to which such speech has previously been subordinated.
I. Early Developments
A. Announcement of the Distinction
The dispute prompting the announcement of the commercial speech
distinction in Valentine v. Chrestensen'9 involved a New York City anti-
litter ordinance prohibiting street distribution of commercial advertising
matter.20 Under authority of -the ordinance, police restrained one F.J.
Chrestensen from distributing handbills that on one side advertised his
exhibition of a submarine and on the other side protested the ordinance.
Chrestensen challenged the police action on First Amendment grounds,
and the Second Circuit affirmed an order enjoining enforcement of the
ordinance against him. The court's holding was based not on the in-
validity of the ordinance as to commercial advertising, but rather on
17. 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976), affg 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974).
18. The Court has previously upheld analogous statutes, but without being pre-
sented with a First Amendment challenge. Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374
U.S. 424 (1963) (due process and commerce clause); Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (equal protection and due process); Semler v.
Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935) (equal protection, due
process, and contracts clause). Moreover, in these cases the challenges were brought by
the advertisers themselves, not by consumers.
19. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
20. NEw YoRK Cry SANrrARY CoDE § 318 (1938).
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the ground that the protest on one side of the handbill constituted non-
commercial speech and thus raised the entire handbill to protected
status."
The circuit court opinion discussed a number of earlier state court
decisions involving similar ordinances, some of which had been found
overbroad to the extent that they violated constitutional rights.22  But
others, equally broad, had been upheld as valid implements of the
police power to protect the public health and safety, "  while others were
upheld because they had been narrowly drawn to prohibit street dis-
tribution only of commercial matter.24  Judge Jerome Frank's dissent
justified this final category of ordinances and articulated the principle
upon which the Supreme Court subsequently based its position. He
first noted that the purpose of the First Amendment had not been to
protect commercial speech: "[Tjhe historical events which yielded the
constitutional protection of free speech and free expression do not by
any means compel or even suggest the conclusion that there is an
equally important constitutional right to distribute commercial handbills
.... "25 Nor would such a conclusion serve any First Amendment
interests:
21. 122 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1941).
22. Three courts upheld ordinances only insofar as they prohibited posting and
scattering leaflets, but invalidated them insofar as they prohibited personal distribution
to willing recipients. People v. Taylor, 33 Cal. App. 2d 760, 85 P.2d 978 (1938) (po-
litical publication with some advertising); Ex parte Pierce, 127 Tex. Crim. 35, 75 S.W.2d
264 (1934) (advertising matter); People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288, 41 N.W. 275
(1889) (invitations to YMCA gathering). Two courts found ordinances overbroad in
prohibiting all street distribution of advertising matter of any kind. In re Thornburg,
55 Ohio App. 229, 9 N.E.2d 516 (1936) (street photographer's business cards); Chicago
v. Shultz, 341 Ill. 208, 173 N.E. 276 (1930) (advertising circulars).
23. Milwaukee v. Kassen, 203 Wis. 383, 234 N.W. 352 (1931) (political hand-
bills); People v. Horwitz, 27 N.Y. Crim. 237, 140 N.Y.S. 437 (Magis. Ct. 1912) (adver-
tising matter inserted by vendor into newspapers); Philadelphia v. Brabender, 201 Pa.
574, 51 A. 374 (1902) (advertising circulars). Accord, San Francisco Shopping News
Co. v. South San Francisco, 69 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 606 (1934)
(advertising publication with financial news); In re Anderson, 69 Neb. 686, 96 N.W.
149 (1903) (handbills); Wettengel v. Denver, 20 Colo. 552, 39 P. 343 (1895) (leaflets
advertising store). The courts in most of these cases noted that the printed matter in
question was of the sort that would probably become litter.
24. In People v. La Rollo, 24 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Magis. Ct. 1940), an anti-litter ordi-
nance applying only to commercial matter was unsuccessfully attacked as violative of
equal protection. In People v. Johnson, 117 Misc. 133, 191 N.Y.S. 750 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
1921), the New York anti-litter ordinance was held not to apply to NAACP leaflets
protesting activities of the Ku Klux Klan. Coughlin v. Sullivan, 100 NJ.L. 42, 126 A.
177 (Sup. Ct. 1924), followed Johnson in upholding an ordinance regulating the distri-
bution of advertising matter, but holding that it did not apply to a pamphlet criticizing
municipal administration. The presumption was not as great that the latter would be
thrown away and become litter.
25. 122 F.2d at 524.
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So to amplify the constitutional guaranty would be to "thingify"
the words "free speech" and "free expression," and to become for-
getful of the vital ideas-"the defense of liberty" and the function-
ing of "the processes of popular rule"- for which they stand. The
danger of converting words into thought-paralyzing entities is illus-
trated by the judicial history of the phrase "liberty of contract.126
The dissent also found that the two messages on the handbill were
separable and that the coupling of them was an "artificial hybrid"
to which the ordinance could constitutionally be applied.2 7 The Supreme
Court, reversing the Second Circuit, agreed with Judge Frank's dissent
that the protest portion of the handbill was merely an attempt to evade
the ordinance, and upheld the power of the state to prohibit the rise of
public thoroughfares for "purely commercial advertising.
28
B. Evolution Before Chrestensen
Although the 1942 decision in Chrestensen was the first enuncia-
tion by the Supreme Court of a distinction between commercial and
noncommercial expression, the Court had previously upheld laws
directed only against commercial speech and had overturned less
specific laws. For instance, in 1911 in Fifth Avenue Coach Co. v. New
York,2 19 the Court upheld a city ordinance prohibiting the display of
advertisements on vehicles but exempting business notices on business
wagons.30 The company challenged the ordinance as a deprivation of
its property without due process, a denial of equal protection, and an
impairment of the obligations of its contracts. The Court agreed with
the New York Court of Appeals that advertisements on vehicles "would
make such [vehicles] a parade or show for the display of advertise-
ments which would clearly tend to produce congestion upon the
streets."'-' Because the ordinance was therefore a proper exercise of
the police power, its enforcement did not deprive the coach company
of property without due process, nor impair its contractual obligations,
which were subject to the law. The Court also rejected the equal pro-
tection argument on the ground that a "distinction between'business
wagons and those used for advertising purposes has a proper relation
26. Id. at 525.
27. Id. at 526.
28. 316 U.S. at 54-55.
29. 221 U.S. 467 (1911). The decision did not turn on First Amendment princi-
ples because it was not until 1925, in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), that
the Court first indicated that the Fourteenth Amendment would prohibit the states from
abridging the freedom of speech and of the press.
30. The Court later upheld the successor ordinance in Railway Express Agency v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), again without being presqnted with a First Amendment
argument.
31. 221 U.S. at 480, quoting 194 N.Y. 19, 30, 86 N.E. 824, 827 (1909).
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to the purpose of the ordinance. 32
The Supreme Court took a similar position in 1932 when it
decided Packer Corp. v. Utah.33 Under a Utah statute making it a mis-
demeanor to advertise tobacco products in any place other than news-
papers or periodicals and tobacco dealers' stores 3 4 a billboard company
was convicted for displaying a cigarette advertisement. The company's
ultimate appeal to the Supreme Court challenged the statute under the
equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and under the contracts and commerce clauses of article I, but
did not raise a First Amendment argument. 5 The Court addressed
itself primarily to the equal protection issue and found "a difference
which justifies the classification between display advertising and that
in periodicals or newspapers,"'36 in that display advertisements "thrust"
their messages upon the viewer, while those in periodicals or news-
papers cannot convey their messages without an affirmative act by the
reader. The Court rejected the company's due process and contracts
clause arguments under reasoning similar to that in the Fifth Avenue
Coach case: because the statutory prohibition was a valid exercise
of the state's police power, it was neither a taking of property without
due process nor an impairment of contracts. Finally, the Court dis-
posed of the commerce clause challenge on the ground that the statute
operated only within Utah, on advertising matter whose interstate
movement had ceased.37  Finding no constitutional barrier to the stat-
Lite, the Court affirmed the conviction under it.
The Court did, on the other hand, find constitutional barriers to
laws that circumscribed more than commercial expression. In 1938
in Lovell v. Griffin,38 the Court found invalid on its face a city
ordinance prohibiting "the distribution of literature of any kind at any
time, at any place, and in any manner without a permit."39 The appel-
lant, who had been convicted for distributing religious tracts without
obtaining the required permit, challenged the ordinance as a restraint
32. 221 U.S. at 484.
33. 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
34. 1929 Utah Laws 173 ch. 92, § 2, as amended, UTAH CoDE ANN. § 76-10-
102 (Supp. 1975).
35. For a similar case in which the First Amendment was raised, see Howard v.
State Dept. of Highways, 478 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1973), upholding the Colorado Out-
door Advertising Act, which required a permit to maintain signs on state highways. The
court cited Chrestensen and Packer in rejecting the First Amendment argument, finding
a legitimate exercise of the police power of states in the "regulation and prohibition of
various forms of outdoor commercial advertising." Id. at 584.
36. 285 U.S. at 110.
37. Id. at 111.
38. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
39. Id. at 451.
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upon the free exercise of religion and as an abridgement of the freedom
of the press. The Court declined to address the issue of religious free-
dom, 40 but reversed the conviction upon a finding that the law "strikes
at the very foundation of the freedom of the press"41 in requiring a
permit without regard to the type of literature involved or to the time,
place, or manner of its distribution.
The Court discussed Lovell the following year in Schneider v.
State,42 a review of four state court decisions. In each case a city
ordinance had to some extent limited the freedom to distribute litera-
ture, and in each case the state court had distinguished Lovell and
affirmed convictions under the ordinances. The Los Angeles, Califor-
nia, and Worchester, Massachusetts, anti-litter ordinances prohibited
distribution of literature only along public streets or in parks, and on
that basis were distinguished from the ordinance in Lovell, which pro-
hibited distribution anywhere in the city. The Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
ordinance prohibited distribution in all public places, but unlike the ordi-
nance in Lovell, its only purpose was to prevent littering and it was
construed by the state not to be enforceable against the distributor
unless his activities actually resulted in littering. The Supreme Court
rejected these distinctions and reversed the convictions, finding that the
burden upon cities to keep streets clean "does not justify an exertion
of the police power which invades the free communication of informa-
tion and opinion. '43  The Irvington, New Jersey, ordinance required
a permit for house-to-house distribution and solicitation, and the state
court found Lovell not controlling because the ordinance condemned
in that case required a permit for all distribution of literature. The.
Supreme Court also rejected this distinction because of the discretion
given to the police in refusing permits,"4 and because alternative means
40. The issue had been raised in an earlier challenge to the same ordinance and
the Supreme Court had dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question.
Coleman v. City of Griffin, 55 Ga. App. 123, 189 S.E. 427 (1936), appeal dismissed,
302 U.S. 636 (1937).
41. 303 U.S. at 451.
42. 308 U.S. 147 (1939), rev'g Town of Irvington v. Schneider, 121 N.J.L. 542,
3 A.2d 609 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939); Milwaukee v. Snyder, 230 Wis. 131, 283 N.W. 301
(1939); Commonwealth v. Nichols, 301 Mass. 584, 18 N.E.2d 166 (1938); People v.
Young, 33 Cal. App. 2d 747, 85 P.2d 231 (1938).
43. 308 U.S. at 163.
44. See also Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (invalidating an ordinance re-
quiring a permit for distribution of any literature in public places); Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290 (1951) (invalidating an ordinance giving the police commissioner wide
discretion in denying a permit to a speaker whose meetings had caused disorder). Pou-
los v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953), distinguished both of these cases in uphold-
ing an ordinance requiring a license to hold a public meeting, because the state had inter-
preted it as requiring even-handed administration. Of the two earlier cases the Court
in Poulos said that "the ordinances were held invalid, not because they regulated the
Summer 1976]
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were available to the town for dealing with trespass and fraud. In all
four cases, the ordinances had been enforced against persons distribut-
ing religious or political matter,45 and in reversing the New Jersey case
the Court noted that the decision was "not to be taken as holding that
commercial soliciting and canvassing may not be subjected to such regu-
lation as the ordinance requires. '46  This indication that the same pro-
tections might not apply to commercial as to noncommercial expression
foreshadowed the distinction the Court would make three years later
in Chrestensen.
C. Refinements After Chrestensen: Balancing
In 1943, shortly after deciding Chrestensen, the Court again
distinguished commercial from noncommercial speech, but this time to
favor the latter. The distinction was made in Jamison v. Texas, 7 Jones
v. Opelika,48 and Murdock v. Pennsylvania,4 9 all involving solicitation
of contributions for religious literature, and in Martin v. City of
Struthers,5" involving door-to-door distribution of religious literature.
In Jamison a city ordinance prohibited street distribution of advertising
matter. Jamison had been convicted for distributing handbills con-
taining both an invitation to a religious meeting and an advertisement
for the sale of religious books. The Court reversed the conviction,
rejecting the city's argument that the ordinance could constitutionally
be applied in such circumstances:
The states can prohibit the use of -the streets for the distribu-
tion of purely commercial leaflets, even though such leaflets may
have "a civic appeal, or a moral platitude" appended. [Citing
Chrestensen.] They may not prohibit the distribution of handbills
in the pursuit of a clearly religious activity merely because the
handbills invite the purchase of books... or because the handbills
seek in a lawful fashion to promote the raising of funds for religious
purposes. 51
,The Court quoted this language in reversing the convictions in Murdock
and in Jones. In Jones, city ordinances requiring the payment of a
use of the parks for meeting and instruction but because they left complete discretion
to refuse the use in the hands of officials." Id. at 406-07.
45. The California and Massachusetts cases involved street distribution of an-
nouncements of a meeting to discuss the war in Spain and invitations to a meeting pro-
testing administration of state unemployment insurance, respectively. The Wisconsin
case involved distribution by store pickets of a position statement in a labor dispute, and
the New Jersey case involved door-to-door religious solicitation.
46. 308 U.S. at 165.
47. 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
48. 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
49. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
50. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
51. 318 U.S. at 417.
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fee for a license to sell goods had been enforced against peddlers of
religious literature. 52  The Court vacated its earlier opinion in that
case, which had followed Chrestensen in holding:
When proponents of religious or social theories use the ordi-
nary commercial methods of sales of articles to raise propaganda
funds, it is a natural and proper exercise of the power of the State
to charge reasonable fees for the privilege of canvassing.
58
The Court's reasons for abandoning this position were stated in Murdock,
where an ordinance requiring payment of a fee for a license to canvas or
solicit was applied to door-to-door sales of religious pamphlets.5 4 The
Court found that the imposition of a license fee on such activities was a
restraint upon the freedom of religion and of the press.55
That same day in Martin the Court reviewed an ordinance making
it unlawful to distribute handbills to residents in their homes. The
ordinance, which had been enforced against a door-to-door distributor
of leaflets advertising a religious meeting, was held invalid as an inter-
ference with the freedom of speech and of the press. 56  The Court
weighed the First Amendment rights claimed by Martin against the
interests of householders in not being disturbed and those of the city
in protecting its residents from annoyance and crime, concluding that
the hazards of distribution could "easily be controlled by traditional
legal methods, leaving to each householder, the full right to decide
whether he will receive strangers as visitors.
57
5,2. 316 U.S. 584, 586-91 (1942), vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
53. 316 U.S. at 597.
54. 319 U.S. at 10607. See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
(invalidating, as applied to solicitors for a religious cause, an ordinance requiring a cer-
tificate of approval to solicit money for any purpose).
55. 319 U.S. at 114. Accord, Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (flat
license tax on book agents invalid as applied to distributor of religious tracts); Largent
v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943) (ordinance requiring permit to offer books for sale in-
valid as applied to peddler of religious books).
56. 319 U.S. at 149. See also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (reversing
conviction under trespass statute as applied to distributors of religious literature in a
company-owned town); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946) (same, but in a govern-
ment-owned town).
57. 319 U.S. at 147. Also decided that day was Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S.
157 (1943), involving members of the same religious group, who sought an injunction
against enforcement of the ordinance in Jeannette, Pennsylvania, where Murdock arose.
Due to the Murdock decision, the injunction was denied as unnecessary. Justice Jackson
concurred in Douglas and dissented in Murdock and Martin, finding a parallel with the
facts in Chrestensen, where there was a civic appeal on one side of the handbill and
a commercial advertisement on the other. Id. at 180 n.4. Justice Jackson gave greater
weight than the majority to the rights of householders to be undisturbed, and found that
the First Amendment protects freedom to practice religion, but not "to force it upon oth-
ers." Id. at 182. Not all religious practices have been allowed. See, e.g., Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878), where, in upholding a law against polygamy,
the Court noted that although the laws "cannot interfere with mere religious belief and
Summner 19761
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In 1951 the Court distinguished the Martin case in deciding
Breard v. Alexandria,58 upholding an ordinance prohibiting, as a
nuisance, door-to-door solicitation by uninvited peddlers. The Court
referred to the prohibition as a "Green River ordinance," 59 after two
cases arising in Green River, Wyoming, both upholding an ordinance
similar to that in Breard. In 1933, in Green River v. Fuller Brush
Co.,60 the Tenth Circuit found the ordinance an appropriate exercise
of the police power to prevent disturbance of residents and upheld it
against assertions that it deprived the company of property without due
process, denied it equal protection, and interfered with interstate com-
merce. Three years later, in Green River v. Bunger,6' the Wyoming
Supreme Court upheld the same ordinance against the same challenges
and against one further argument. A Fuller Brush salesman had
attempted to avoid the "not having been requested or invited" provision
of the ordinance by going from house to house soliciting invitations to
return with his brushes, and he argued that the prohibition did not
apply in such circumstances. But the court found that the salesman
disturbed residents as much by soliciting invitations as he would by
soliciting orders for his wares, and so held that the proscription of the
ordinance encompassed both activities.
The ordinance in Breard, like that in the Green River cases, was
upheld against due process and commerce clause challenges. Breard,
however, was selling magazine subscriptions rather than brushes, so the
Supreme Court was also presented with a First Amendment argument
that the ordinance abridged the freedom of the press. Without citing
Chrestensen, the Court drew the same distinction drawn therein, point-
ing out that the selling of the subscriptions "brings into the transaction
a commercial feature." 62 The Court emphasized this point when it dis-
tinguished the ordinance in Martin on the ground that it "was not aimed
'solely at commercial advertising.' ",6 The Court found, then, that the
constitutionality of the ordinance turned "upon a balancing of the con-
opinions, they may with practices." Accord, Church of Latter Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
58. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
59. Id. at 627. The model was Green River, Wyo., Ordinance 175 (Nov. 16, 1931),
which provided: "Section 1. The practice of going in and upon private residences in
the Town of Green River, Wyoming, by solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant mer-
chants and transient vendors of merchandise, not having been requested or invited so
to do by the owner or owners, occupant or occupants of said private residences, for the
purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares and merchandise, and/or for
the purpose of disposing of and/or peddling or hawking the same, is hereby declared
to be a nuisance, and punishable as such nuisance as a misdemeanor."
60. 65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933).
61. 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P.2d 456 (1936), appeal dismissed, 300 U.S. 638 (1937).
62. 341 U.S. at 642.
63. Id., quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142 n.1 (1943).
[Vol. 3
STATUS OF COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION
veniences between some householders' desire for privacy and the pub-
lisher's right to distribute publications in the precise way that those
soliciting for him think brings the best results."'64  The Court, having
noted that "the exigencies of trade are not ordinarily expected to have
a higher rating constitutionally than the tranquillity of the fireside," 5
concluded that the ordinance did not abridge the freedom of the
press.
66
Thus, the treatment of commercial speech has been a threshold
question, followed by a balancing of interests. The threshold was a
determination whether there was any purpose in the expression other
than a commercial transaction. If, as in Chrestensen, the purpose was
purely commercial, regulating the speech was a matter for legislative
judgment.67 If, on the other hand, the speaker had some other pur-
64. 341 U.S. at 644.
65. Id. at 627.
66. Justice Black, dissenting, would have invalidated the law as applied to sellers
of magazine subscriptions, but felt that it "could constitutionally be applied to a 'mer-
chant' who goes from door to door 'selling pots."' Id. at 650. He found the majority
opinion irreconcilable with Jones, Murdock, and Martin. See text accompanying notes
48-57 supra.
67. In a variety of cases federal courts have found that certain expression did not
merit analysis beyond this threshold. For instance, Morgan v. Detroit, 389 F. Supp. 922
(E.D. Mich. 1975), upheld a city ordinance prohibiting solicitation for prostitution,
where neither the city nor the state made prostitution itself a crime. After discussing
the difference between advocating the legalization of prostitution, which involves debate
on a matter of controversy, and soliciting for prostitution, which does not, the court de-
cided that the latter was essentially commercial: "Whatever else one might say about
the act of accosting and soliciting, it is doubtlessly intended to sell a product." Id. at
927. Other prohibitions of certain expression have been upheld when the interests at
stake on both sides were far from compelling. See, e.g., Ad-Express, Inc. v. Kirvin, 516
F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1975) (ordinance making it unlawful to leave advertising literature
or samples at residences without prior written consent of occupants); Sabin v. Butz, 515
F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1975) (denial by the Forest Service of a special permit to give
ski instruction in a national forest); Boscia v. Warren, 359 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. Wis.
1973) (ordinance prohibiting use of the word "saloon" in the name of a tavern); Hodges
v. Fitle, 332 F. Supp. 504 (D. Neb. 1971) (ordinance providing for revocation of the
liquor license of a licensee employing nude entertainers: topless dancing is expression,
but with a commercial purpose). In other cases the interests to be served by regulating
commercial speech have been more significant. The SEC has successfully urged the
commercial speech distinction in several cases. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971) (imposing lia-
bility for mere negligence in preparing a news release that violated the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934); SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371, 1379 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970) (requirement that investment advisors register
with the SEC upheld as applied to a publication acting as such an advisor against a claim
of abridgment of the freedom of the press); Halsted v. SEC, 182 F.2d 660, 668 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 834 (1950) (prohibiting a stockholders' protective commit-
tee from soliciting financial contributions from stockholders). The distinction was also
invoked to uphold a ban on all promotional advertisement of the New York State lottery.
New York State Broadcasters Ass'n v. United States, 414 F.2d 990, 998 (2d Cir.
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pose, such as promulgating religious ideas or exercising the freedom
of the press, the competing interests at stake had to be balanced. In those
cases involving religious expression the commercial purpose was found
to be very slight, and in the balance between the interests of advocates
in spreading their religion and those of the state in preventing litter
or protecting its citizens, the religious interests weighed more heavily.68
But in a similar balance between the interests of the press in a particu-
lar method of selling magazines and those of the state in securing the
privacy of its citizens, where the commercial purpose of the prohibited
activity was substantial, the interest in privacy weighed more heavily.,9
The economic interest did not remove all protection, but rather became
a factor in determining when one person's freedom of expression had
to be limited in order that other interests, such as privacy, might be
protected.
M. Interests Involved in Distinguishing
Commercial From Noncommercial Expression
A. Privacy
The Supreme Court has found an implicit right of privacy
embodied in "several fundamental constitutional guarantees,"70 includ-
ing the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970). And a denial of antitrust immunity for ef-
forts to influence public officials, where efforts were made to sell products to officials
acting under competitive bidding statutes, was upheld as not violating rights of petition
or of free speech because only commercial expression was involved. George R. Whitten,
Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 33 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 850 (1970). In such cases as these, the inhibiting effect of the legislation on the
free expression of ideas is slight, and governmental interests, whether trivial or weighty,
are therefore accorded great deference.
68. In later cases in which states have raised the commercial speech distinction in
defense of legislation, courts have invalidated ordinances that went beyond the scope of
the ordinance in Chrestensen to inhibit noncommercial expression. See, e.g., Wulp V.
Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826 (1st Cir. 1972) (ordinance requiring anyone selling newspapers
on the street to obtain a permit); Strother v. Thompson, 372 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1967)
(ordinance under which city council had unfettered discretion in issuing permits required
for distribution of handbills); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. New Or-
leans, 347 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. La. 1972) (ordinance prohibiting solicitation of money,
as applied to a religious group).
69. Cf. Borough of Collingswood v. Ringgold, 66 NJ. 350, 331 A.2d 262 (1975),
affirming convictions for violation of an ordinance requiring a permit to canvas or so-
licit. Defendants were surveying listener preferences for radio stations by interviewing
residents in their homes, an activity the court found not within the concept of commer-
cial speech. Nevertheless, the court upheld the ordinance on the ground that it did not
regulate pure speech, but only "door-to-door activity on private property," a limited kind
of activity. Id. at 365, 331 A.2d at 271.
70. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (Justice Douglas for the
Court in a plurality opinion).
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The courts have denied First Amendment protection to commercial
speech, or drawn a distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech, in order to safeguard two features of this right of privacy, the
right to be left alone and the right to one's reputation.7 '
1. The Right to Be Left Alone
In 1951 the Supreme Court protected the right of householders
to be left alone--"the tranquillity of the fireside"--in Breard v.
Alexandria.72 Although the Court had refused to protect this interest
against intrusion by religious advocates, 7 the intruder in Breard added
a "commercial feature" to the balance of interests, which then weighed
more heavily in favor of privacy.
Nineteen years later the Court reaffirmed this right to be left alone
in Rowan v. Post Office Department,74 upholding a federal postal stat-
ute75 against a First Amendment challenge. The statute allows the
postmaster general, at the request of an individual receiving pandering
advertisements in the mail, to require the sender to strike the individ-
ual's name from the mailing list and to refrain from sending further
mailings to that address. The statute gives the mail recipient absolute
discretion to determine whether the initial advertisement is "erotically
arousing or sexually provocative. '76 The first question considered by
the Court was whether "further mailings" meant "all future mailings,"
"all future mailings of advertising material," or "all future mailings of
similar materials.177  In order to avoid the appearance of censorship
by the post office, the Court decided that the provision must be con-
strued to prohibit all future mailings. Moreover, the Court rejected the
argument that the addressee's "sole discretion" in determining what is
objectionable should be reviewable by a court. The Court read the
statute broadly, both to protect privacy and to avoid vesting a censor-
ship function in the postmaster general, and concluded that it would
encompass all advertisements: "In operative effect the power of the
householder under the statute is unlimited; he may prohibit the mailing
of a dry goods catalog .... "78 Thus the only questions for the post-
master general or for a court are whether the initial mailing was an
71. The conclusion that the right to one's reputation is one instance of a larger
right of privacy was reached in the seminal article by Warren & Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 H~Av. L REv. 193, 205 (1890).
72. 341 U.S. 622, 627 (1951).
73. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1943). See notes 49-57 and accompanying text supra.
74. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
75. 39 U.S.C. § 4009 (Supp. IV, 1964), as amended, 39 U.S.C. § 3008 (1971).
76. Id. § 4009(a).
77. 397 U.S. at 732.
78. Id. at 737.
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advertisement and whether the sender mailed any other material to the
addressee more than thirty days after receiving a prohibitory order.7 9
In evaluating the sender's asserted First Amendment right of expres-
sion, the Court found that the right of some individuals to communicate
must be balanced against the right of others to be left alone.s0 The
Court concluded that in this case the right of privacy weighed more
heavily: "If this prohibition operates to impede the flow of even valid
ideas, the answer is that no one has a right to press even 'good' ideas
on an unwilling recipient.1
81
In a number of cases the Court has protected the privacy of the
unwilling recipient from the free expression of advertisers. As early
as 1932, in Packer Corp. v. Utah,8 2 this kind of privacy provided the
justification for a state statute prohibiting tobacco advertisements in
public places, but exempting stores and periodicals. In a discussion
of the equal protection issue raised by a billboard company, the Court
pointed out that display advertisements were "constantly before the
eyes of the observers," 8's and concluded that the state had a valid inter-
est in protecting its citizens from this kind of visual imposition upon
their privacy.8 4
In 1974 the Supreme Court protected unwilling recipients by
using a novel approach to the commercial speech distinction in Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights.5 An advertising company, pursuant to its
contract with the city, declined to accept political advertisements for
display in the city-owned rapid transit cars on which the company
managed the advertising space. A candidate for public office, who was
refused space on the cars for his campaign signs, challenged the city's
policy as violative of his free speech and equal protection rights. He
argued that the advertising space on the cars constituted a public forum
for First Amendment speech and that nondiscriminatory access to that
forum was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court dis-
agreed in a plurality opinion by Justice Blackmun, who cited the Packer
case for the proposition that display advertising imposes itself upon the
observer, and noted specifically that a "streetcar audience is a captive
79. Id. at 739 and n.6.
80. Id. at 736.
81. Id. at 738.
82. 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
83. Id. at 110, quoting State v. Packer Corp., 77 Utah 500, 515, 297 P. 1013, 1019
(1931).
84. See also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), upholding an ordinance for-
bidding the use of a "loud and raucous" loudspeaker on any public street, because the
"unwilling listener ... is practically helpless to escape this interference with his pri-
vacy. . . ." Id. at 86-87.
85. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
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audience.""" The distinction between commercial and noncommercial
expression provided the Court's answer to the argument urged by the
dissent 87 that the advertising space on the transit cars constituted a
forum subject to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection. Be-
cause the city allowed only commercial advertisements on the cars, no
such forum had been created:
The city consciously has limted access to its transit system adver-
tising space in order to minimize chances of abuse, the appearance
of favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a captive audience.
These are reasonable legislative objectives advanced by the city in
a proprietary capacity. In these circumstances, there is no First or
Fourteenth Amendment violation. 88
Justice Douglas concurred in upholding the city's policy, emphasizing
the right to privacy of the transit system's passengers:
,[T]he right of the commuters to be free from forced intrusions on
their privacy precludes the city from transforming its vehicles of
public transportation into forums for the dissemination of ideas
upon this captive audience.8 9
The treatment of commercial speech as different in kind from noncom-
mercial speech,90 then, may operate both to exclude commercial
expression from areas in which noncommercial expression must be pro-
tected, and to allow commercial advertising in certain places without
creating a forum for the exercise of political speech; both applica-
tions preserve the interests of privacy..
2. The Right to One's Reputation
The distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech
has also been used to protect the privacy of one's personal life against
86. Id. at 302, quoting PUC v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952). Pollak upheld
a PUC decision to allow a transit company to broadcast radio programs in its cars, a
survey having shown 92% passenger approval.
87. 418 U.S. at 315 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall,
and Powell).
88. Id. at 304.
89. Id. at 307.
90. The suggestion that commercial speech is different in kind, rather than merely
different in degree, from noncommercial speech was also made in Jenness v. Forbes, 351
F. Supp. 88 (D.R.I. 1972), where the distinction was cited in support of noncommercial
activities. In upholding the right of a political group to distribute leaflets in housing
areas of a Navy base, the court found that although the commandant exercised valid
control over commercial activities in the area, it did not follow that he could also control
political activities: "Commercial speech is not protected by the First Amendment
[citing Chrestensen], so these restrictions on commercial activities involve no submis-
sion of otherwise constitutionally protected activities to military authority." Id. at 96-
97. For other cases involving political activities on private property, see Petersen v. Tal.
isman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973) (company labor camp); Unemployed
Workers Union v. Hackett, 332 F. Supp. 1372 (D.RI. 1971) (state unemployment of-
fice).
Summer 19761
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
libel with a purely commercial motive. Defamation had traditionally
been regarded as a form of speech unprotected by the First Amend-
ment 91 until the Supreme Court, in a series of decisions beginning with
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,9 2 expanded the scope of constitutional
guarantees to give the press a greater privilege against libel suits. As
announced in New York Times, a public official may not recover
damages for a defamatory report about his official conduct without
proof that the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with
reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. 3  The Supreme Court subse-
quently applied this test of "actual malice" in an action for invasion of
privacy in connection with a matter of public interest,9 4 and applied a
modified form of the test in actions for libel of public figures.9 5 This
special treatment has not, however, been accorded to defamatory publi-
cations with no purpose other than a purely economic one. The
Court drew the distinction in New York Times, a libel action based on
statements in an editorial advertisement for which the newspaper space
had been purchased:
The publication here was not a "commercial" advertisement
in the sense in which the word was used in Chrestensen. It com-
municated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, pro-
tested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of
a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the high-
est public interest and concern.96
The Court found further that if the statements themselves were pro-
tected by the First Amendment, that protection extended to the news-
paper, regardless of its acceptance of payment for the publication space.
The Court found such a conclusion necessary in order not to discourage
the press from making its advertising space available to the public as
"tan important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas."' T
91. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). "mhe common law rules that sub-
ject the libeler to responsibility ... are not abolished by the protection extended in our
constitutions." Id. at 715.
92. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
93. Id. at 279-80.
94. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
95. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), requiring only "highly
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investiga-
tion and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. at 155.
96. 376 U.S. at 266.
97. Id. A recent case refusing to apply the New York Times test to commercial
matter was Rinaldi v. Village Voice, Inc., 47 App. Div. 2d 180, 365 N.Y.S.2d 199,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975). The Village Voice had first published news
stories about a public figure, making allegations that would have been subject to the pro-
tections of the New York Times test. Later, the Voice solicited subscriptions by adver-
tising in another paper, making sufficiently detailed, reference to the earlier articles that,
unless the allegations were true or were constitutionally privileged, the advertisement
would be actionable libel. The plaintiff brought an action for libel and for invasion
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The considerations that required protection of the press in New
York Times are not present in publications with a purely commercial
purpose. In Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,9 the Fifth Circuit in 1973
allowed the plaintiff to pursue a libel action for defamatory statements
in a credit report. The defendant argued that the New York Times
test should apply to give its reports a constitutional privilege absent
proof of actual malice because the information was of public interest.90
The court cited Chrestensen in holding that "matters of general and
public interest do not include libelous and defamatory publications of
such a commercial nature as credit reports."'100 The court discussed
the distinction between the content of the advertisement in New York
Times and that in Chrestensen and concluded that "because this com-
mercial credit report did not express social concerns and grievances
.. . such a report coincides with the doctrine of commercial
speech."' 1  The report was therefore not protected by the First
Amendment, and in the absence of a privilege granted by the state,102
the defamation was actionable without a showing of actual malice.
of privacy based not on the earlier articles, but on the later advertisement, and the Voice
raised the defense of constitutional privilege. The trial court dismissed the defense, find-
ing first a parallel with the commercial purpose of the advertisement in Chrestensen,
and second a difference from the situation in New York Times in that here the Voice
had access to the pages of its own publication and did not need to purchase advertising
space in another paper in order to express social concerns. Rinaldi v. Village Voice,
Inc., 79 Misc. 2d 57, 359 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1974). The appellate court upheld the order,
distinguishing between an advertisement like that in New York Times and one "de-
signed solely to sell The Village Voice." 47 App. Div. 2d at 182, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
The case appears to answer a question presented in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967), where Justice Harlan pointed out that the Hill decision left open "the question
whether a state may apply more stringent limitations to the use of the personality in
'purely commercial advertising.'" Id. at 405 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). Certiorari was denied in Rinaldi for want of a final judgment, so the
Supreme Court has yet to pass on the question.
98. 486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 985 (1974).
99. The New York Times privilege had been extended to libel of private persons
in reporting matters of public interest, by a plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), but the decision was apparently limited or overruled
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), which held that the New York
Times rule does not apply if the individual defamed is neither a public official nor a
public figure. Hood was decided before Gertz and defendants had relied on Rosen-
bloom.
100. 486 F.2d at 29. Accord, Oberman V. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d 1381
(7th Cir. 1972); Kansas Elec. Supply Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 448 F.2d 647 (10th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1026 (1972).
101. 486 F.2d at 30.
102. The court in Hood noted that a majority of the states granted a conditional
privilege to credit reporting agencies. 486 F.2d at 30 n.12. Georgia, where the case
arose, had not recognized such a privilege, and the Fifth Circuit declined to presume
that a state court would do so if presented with the opportunity. Id. at 31-32.
Summer 976] STATUS OF COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
In Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,0 3 a 1971 case very similar
to Hood, the Third Circuit had held that mere negligence would
support an action for libel in a credit report. The court recognized that
if New York Times were controlling, as urged by defendant, investiga-
tory error would not constitute the required recklessness to meet the
test.10 4 But the court found that the report was "not a medium entitled
to that extended constitutional protection."'' 05 The Supreme Court
denied certiorari in the case, and Justice Douglas dissented, pointing
out that "[tihe language of the First Amendment does not except
speech directed at private economic decisionmaking."'-0 6 He argued
that states should no longer be permitted to award damages for defama-
tion, since the First Amendment had proscribed a federal libel law, and
since the First Amendment was now binding upon the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. He concluded that even deliberate false-
hoods should be protected, as "catalytic elements which tend to cause
us to react, to rethink, and to reply.' 0 7 However, as the circuit court
in Grove had pointed out:
Plaintiff here is denied fthe] opportunity to respond to such false
assertions both because it lacks the very access to the medium
which [New York] Times and its progeny assumed, and for the
more pernicious reason that the source or nature of the assertions
may never be exposed.'1 8
The victim of a credit Teport, who has but a limited opportunity to react
or to reply to its contents, is given some protection by the recognition
that speech in this commercial context is not entitled to the constitu-
tional privilege accorded to political advertisements like that in New
York Times. 0'9
In cases where speech affects privacy, courts are faced with
conflicting claims of fundamental rights. The First Amendment
guarantees freedom of expression, but freedom from intrusion upon
one's senses, from invasion of one's home, and from abuse of one's per-
sonality are equally fundamental to human existence, even if not
explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. Courts must necessarily
balance these conflicting interests, and when commercialism is added
103. 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 898 (1971).
104. Id. at 435 n.2.
105. Id. at 437.
106. 404 U.S. at 905 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas also asserted that
the Chrestensen "holding was ill-conceived and has not weathered subsequent scrutiny."
Id.
107. Id. at 900.
108. 438 F.2d at 437.
109. For an exhaustive study of the invasion of privacy by credit reporting agencies,
see Note, Constitutional Right of Privacy and Investigative Consumer Reports: Little
Brother Is Watching You, 2 HAsTINGs CONST. L.Q. 773 (1975).
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to the scales, they generally weigh more heavily in favor of privacy,
both as a right to be left alone and as a right to defend one's reputation.
B. Equal Protection
Freedom of expression has also at times conflicted with freedom
from discrimination, a fundamental right some elements of which are
incorporated into the Constitution by the Fourteenth Amendment.
While that amendment prohibits the states from denying to anyone the
equal protection of the laws, it does not regulate the conduct of individ-
uals. Congress enacted fair housing legislation in the Civil Rights Act
of 1968,110 however, which does restrict certain acts of discrimination
by individuals. The distinction between commercial and noncommer-
cial speech has been invoked to promote equal protection interests in
two cases upholding fair housing provisions of the 1968 act and in cases
upholding a related state law and a city ordinance aimed at employment
discrimination.
1. Fair Housing and Commercial Speech
In 1972 the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Hunter"' upheld
the constitutionality of a fair housing provision of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968 prohibiting the publication of a discriminatory notice relating
to the sale or rental of a dwelling."' The defendant, editor and pub-
lisher of a weekly newspaper, had printed a classified advertisement
for an apartment for rent in a "white home." The dwelling was itself
exempt from regulation under another provision of the act," 3 but the
exemption did not extend to the advertisement." 4  Defendant argued
that the statutory prohibition abridged the freedom of the press, both
by curtailing a source of the newspaper's income and by imposing a
prior restraint upon publication. The court found no such infringe-
ment. First, publicizing an intent to discriminate was prohibited "only
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1968).
111. 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1968), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1974), made
it unlawful "[t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any
notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that
indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, or
national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimina-
tion." The 1974 amendment added the word "sex" after "religion."
113. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (1968) exempts from the provisions of § 3604, "other
than subsection (c)," an owner-occupied dwelling intended to be occupied by no more
than four families.
114. In giving effect to the terms of § 3603(b), the court said: "While the owner
or landlord of an exempted dwelling is free to indulge his discriminatory preferences
in selling or renting that dwelling, neither the Act nor the Constitution gives him a right
to publicize his intent to so discriminate." 459 F.2d at 213.
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in a commercial context and not in relation to the dissemination of
ideas.""u 5 In finding that -therefore no First Amendment rights were
violated, the court referred to "an unbroken line of authority"'16 that
distinguished between commercial and noncommercial speech. The
defendant argued that such a distinction was irrelevant under the cir-
cumstances, since he needed revenues from classified advertising in
order to publish his newspaper. The court found it doubtful that any
revenues would be lost, since potential advertisers were also barred
from private publication of discriminatory rental proposals and would
therefore have no inducement to discontinue use of newspaper want
ads. The court held moreover that the proscription was not an unlaw-
ful prior restraint because the prohibited expression was purely com-
mercial and thus not entitled to full First Amendment protection. The
court noted that enforcement of the act would have no effect on
defendant's right to publish articles or editorials about racial discrimina-
tion or about the act; he was simply prevented from publishing a ra-
cially discriminatory proposal to enter into a commercial transaction.
The following year in United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty,
Inc., 1 7 the Fifth Circuit applied the commercial speech distinction to
uphold another fair housing provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.11'
The section prohibits the "blockbusting" device of representing to white
homeowners that nonwhites are moving into the neighborhood, so that
residents will sell their homes for less than fair value and real estate
agents will reap profits upon resale. The trial court found that defend-
ant real estate brokers had made representations prohibited by the
act," '9 and defendant on appeal argued that the section violated his
First Amendment right to free speech. The Fifth Circuit disagreed,
noting that the statute proscribed only representations made for profit,
and that the profit motive rendered the speech commercial and not
entitled to full First Amendment protection. Defendant further argued
that if the representations were true they could not be prohibited.
Again the court disagreed, drawing an analogy with the facts in Chres-
115. Id. at 211.
116. Id., citing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942); Breard v. Alexan-
dria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951); New York State Broadcasters Ass'n, Inc. v. United
States, 414 F.2d 990, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970); Banz-
haf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1099-1103 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969); Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), affd
sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
117. 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1968), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1974), made
it unlawful "[flor profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any
dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neighbor-
hood of a person or persons of a particular race, color, religion, or national origin." The
1974 amendment added the word "sex" after "religion."
119. United States v. Mitchell, 335 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
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tensen to conclude that the government could legitimately prohibit
speech with a commercial purpose even if some additional purpose
were asserted. Here, the balance between spreading truth and ending
discrimination was resolved in favor of the latter: "Any informational
value in a statement violative of [the section] is clearly outweighed by
the government's overriding interest in preventing blockbusting.'
20
The court pointed out that the statute proscribed only profit-motivated
commercial speech consisting of racial representations, and that similar
representations made without a profit motive remained protected . 2'
In 1974 the Seventh Circuit upheld a city ordinance 22 also
directed against blockbusting in Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary.'
23
The ordinance prohibited the use of "For Sale" or similar signs in resi-
dential areas of the city, and was intended to prevent "panic selling"
due to fear of racial integration. Plaintiffs sued the city, challenging
the ordinance as, inter alia, violative of their freedom of speech. Be-
cause freedom of speech is a fundamental right, plaintiffs argued, the
state cannot restrict the expression absent a compelling governmental
interest. The district court found, however, that fundamental rights
were not involved because the expression prohibited by the ban on
"For Sale" signs was purely commercial: "The Supreme Court has con-
sistently held that reasonable regulations upon communications of a
purely commercial nature are not subject to scrutiny under the First
Amendment."'12 4 As no fundamental rights were in jeopardy, the court
had only to find the ordinance reasonable and rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose. The court found from the evidence
that the proliferation of "For Sale" signs in neighborhoods of mixed
racial composition created fears among white residents that the area
was losing its stability, that it would become segregated, and that their
property values would decline. These fears then became self-fulfilling
as white residents sold their homes at depressed prices to nonwhites.
Prohibition of the signs would remove a source of the pressure to sell,
and neighborhoods would remain more stable.'25 The court held that
the ordinance was a reasonable and appropriate means for achieving
a legitimate goal, the elimination of racial segregation, by creating an
atmosphere of security and balance in the city's neighborhoods.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit adopted the district court's opinion
as its own, but commented further on the commercial nature of the pro-
hibited speech. Although the purpose of a "For Sale" sign is commer-
120. 474 F.2d at 122.
121. Id.
122. Gary, Ind., Ordinance 4685 (July 25, 1972).
123. 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'g 354 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Ind. 1973).
124. 354 F. Supp. at 132.
125. Id. at 135.
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cial, it also conveys information, so that First Amendment interests are
at issue.126 The court observed, however, that other means of commu-
nication were available to prospective buyers and sellers of homes. In
a balance between the conflicting interests involved, the court found,
as had the court in Bob Lawrence, that the legislative interest in fair
and open housing outweighed any individual interest in commercial
expression that might perpetuate segregated residential areas. The
circuit court in Barrick found support for its holding in a 1973 Supreme
Court decision striking a similar balance with respect to commercial
speech in the context of employment discrimination.
2. Employment Discrimination and Commercial Speech
In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations,2 7 the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance forbidding
employers to engage in discriminatory hiring practices and forbidding
others to aid in those practices.'28 Suit was brought against a news-
paper for aiding in sexually discriminatory hiring by publishing sex-
designated help-wanted advertisements. A cease and desist order was
issued, and the Supreme Court affirmed the order, finding no violation
of the newspaper's First Amendment rights. The Court first indicated
that regulation of newspaper advertising would be impermissible if it
disabled the press by substantially reducing advertising revenues. 2 9  It
was not argued, however, that the decrease in income from sexually
126. 491 F.2d at 164. For the current view of such signs, see Linmark Assocs. v.
Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3345 (U.S.
Nov. 8, 1976).
127. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
128. Pittsburgh Pa., Ordinance 395 (July 8, 1969), amending Ordinance 75 (Feb.
27, 1967), makes it an unlawful employment practice:
"(e) For any employer, employment agency, or labor organization to publish or
circulate, or to cause to be published or circulated, any notice or advertisement relating
to employment or membership which indicates any discrimination because of race, color,
religion, ancestry, national origin or place of birth, or sex.
"(I) For any person, whether or not an employer, employment agency or labor or-
ganization, to aid, incite, compel, coerce or participate in the doing of any act declared
to be an unlawful employment practice by this ordinance ...."
129. 413 U.S. at 382-83. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936), invalidating a state tax on gross receipts from advertising in newspapers. The
Court found that the tax would decrease the amount of revenue realized by the news-
papers and that the direct effect would be to curtail circulation. But cf. Capital Broad-
casting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Capital Broad-
casting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972), upholding a ban on cigarette advertis-
ing in the electronic media as not abridging the freedom of the press. Such advertising
involved over $300 million per year in advertising revenue, and accounted for over
7% of all television advertising revenues. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1102 n.83
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
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discriminatory classified advertisements would impair the financial
strength of Pittsburgh Press. The Court then addressed the commis-
sion's argument that because the prohibited speech was commercial it
was not constitutionally protected. Initially the Court invoked New
York Times to illustrate the proposition that "speech is not rendered
commercial by the mere fact that it relates to an advertisement,"'13 and
that a newspaper's profit motive is not determinative. After emphasiz-
ing that the advertisement in Chrestensen "did no more than propose
a commercial transaction,"'' the court compared the two cases in
weighing the Pittsburgh Press advertisements:
In the crucial respects, the advertisements in the present record
resemble the Chrestensen rather than the Sullivan advertisement.
None expresses a position on whether, as a matter of social policy,
certain positions ought to be filled by members of one or the other
sex, nor does any of them criticize the Ordinance or the Commis-
sion's enforcement practices. Each is no more than a proposal of
possible employment. The advertisements are thus classic exam-
ples of commercial speech.' 3 2
Pittsburgh Press objected to this application of the distinction on the
ground that the newspaper made editorial judgments in accepting and
displaying advertisements, and that it was these, judgments, not the
advertisements, which were in issue and which should be protected.
The Court addressed the issue from the perspective suggested by Pitts-
burgh Press, but decided that the minimal editorial discretion exercised
was insufficient to divest the advertisements of their commercial nature.
The Court concluded that the column headings were sufficiently
integrated with the advertisements beneath to constitute a single com-
mercial message, the thrust of which was "overtly discriminatory."'' 33
The Court then dismissed the newspaper's further argument that, given
the importance of disseminating information about commercial matters,
no distinction should be made between commercial and noncommercial
speech; discriminatory hiring practices were themselves illegal in
Pittsburgh, and no First Amendment interest could be served by adver-
tising the illegal activity. 134
Four justices dissented to the opinion in Pittsburgh Press, and par-
ticularly to its application of the commercial speech doctrine; 85 all
130. 413 U.S. at 384.
131. Id. at 385.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 388.
134. Id. at 388-89.
135. All four insisted that the government could not constitutionally dictate the con-
tent and layout of the advertising in a newspaper. Chief Justice Burger characterized
the Court's holding as a "disturbing enlargement of the 'commercial speech' doctrine."
Id. at 393. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas and Blackmun, stated: "What-
ever validity the Chrestensen case may still retain when limited to its own facts, it er-
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expressed concern over the inhibiting effect the decision might have
on the press and over possible extensions of government interference.
The majority, however, had carefully limited the scope of the holding
to emphasize the right of the newspaper to publish commentary on the
ordinance and to exercise editorial judgment and control over the con-
tent and layout of its stories and commentary."3 6 The decision upheld
only the prohibition of sex-designated help-wanted advertisements,
which promoted a legitimate state interest in eliminating sex discrimina-
tion. As in the fair housing cases, the Court in Pittsburgh Press added
the commercial factor to its balance of interests in order to overcome
an asserted First Amendment right. And, as in the fair housing cases,
the interests to be balanced were both fundamental rights: freedom
of the press on one side and equal protection on the other.
The national commitment to equal protection was manifested in
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that only prohibited
governments from discriminating on the basis of irrelevant characteris-
tics. Statutes forbidding certain discriminatory conduct by individuals
have been upheld under the Fourteenth Amendment on a finding of
state involvement, 3 7 or under article I, section eight when acts of
individuals affect interstate commerce,138 or under the Thirteenth
Amendment on the theory that it mandated the abolition of all badges
and incidents of slavery, including racial discrimination in private prop-
erty transactions.'39 No theory, however, could support legislation
abridging the freedom of individuals or of the press to express ideas
and opinions protected by the First Amendment, no matter how dis-
criminatory and irrational those ideas and opinions might be. 4 ' But
if commercial expression is not fully protected by the First Amend-
tainly does not stand for the proposition that the advertising pages of a newspaper are
outside the protection given the newspaper by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."
Id. at 401.
136. Id. at 391. A year later the Supreme Court had occasion to quote and confirm
this limitation in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 255 (1974).
A unanimous Court invalidated FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973), which required any news-
paper attacking a political candidate to give him, free of cost, equal space to reply. The
Court considered at length the interest of the public in access to the press and the diffi-
culty of gaining that access, but concluded that the First Amendment required that the
press be free of governmental interference in exercising control over the news and com-
mentary it prints.
137. E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
138. E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Kat-
zenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
139. E.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
140. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (5-4 decision), is not to the con-
trary. Although the Court there upheld a conviction under a state law prohibiting pub-
lication of racial defamation, it did so on the ground that libel is not protected by the
First Amendment.
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ment, then legislatures may prohibit discriminatory speech .uttered in
the context of proposing a commercial transaction. Because such
commercial speech does little to accomplish the First Amendment pur-
pose of disseminating information and ideas, and does much to hinder
the national purpose of eliminating irrational classifications, the balance
between the conflicting interests weighs in favor of inhibiting the speech
in order to promote impartial -treatment of the races and the sexes.
C. Public Health
The distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech
was announced in Chrestensen in order to uphold an anti-litter ordi-
nance designed to protect the public health and safety. Since then,
states have often cited Chrestensen in defense of legislation restricting
commercial expression in order to achieve public health goals. The
judicial response has been either to find no purpose in the speech other
than a commercial one and therefore to give effect to the public health
interest, or to find some other value in the speech and to weigh that
value as overriding.
1. Cigarette Advertising
In 1968 the District of Columbia Circuit in Banzhaf v. FCC4 '
found cigarette advertising sufficiently commercial to warrant a balanc-
ing of the free expression of advertisers against the health of the audi-
ence. Banzhaf affirmed an FCC ruling 142 that required radio and tele-
vision stations carrying such advertising to devote a significant amount
of broadcast time, but not necessarily equal time, to presenting the
message that smoking may be a health hazard. The ruling had been
based on the fairness doctrine, an FCC principle that the electronic
media must present a fair and balanced view of controversial public
issues. "'43 The circuit court in Banzhaf, however, declined to rely on
the fairness doctrine, both because its application to product advertising
was without clear precedent, 44 and because the constitutionality of cer-
tain aspects of the doctrine were in doubt while Banzhaf was before
the court and were not finally resolved until the following year.' 45
141. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
142. Television Station WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967).
143. The fairness doctrine as defined differs from the "equal space" requirement im-
posed on newspapers and held unconstitutional in Maimi Herald Publishing Co. v. Tor-
nillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); see note 136 supra. The doctrine differs also from the
"equal time" requirement imposed on the broadcast media for political candidates under
47 U.S.C. § 315 (Supp. IV, 1974).
144. 405 F.2d at 1091-92.
145. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The specific appli-
cation of the doctrine under review in Red Lion was an FCC requirement that a right
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Rather, the opinion was based on the duty of broadcasters to operate
in the public interest, since "the public interest indisputably includes
the public health."14  Broadcasters and advertisers argued that the
FCC ruling was an unconstitutional interference with control by the
electronic media over the content of their broadcasts. The court listed
several reasons for concluding that the ruling would not abridge First
Amendment rights with respect to the advertisements themselves.
Moreover, given the public health purpose of the ruling, the Court con-
cluded that it should be sustained in spite of the broader implications
with respect to broadcasters' autonomy. First, the ruling did not
directly ban any speech, and the only "chilling effect" it might create
would be to make broadcasters reluctant to carry cigarette advertis-
ing.147 Second, the only speech that might conceivably be chilled was
commercial speech and outside the intended scope of constitutional
guarantees:
Promoting the sale of a product is not ordinary associated with
any of the interests the First Amendment seeks to protect. As a
rule, it does not affect the political process, does not contribute to
the exchange of ideas, does not provide information on matters of
public importance, and is not, except perhaps for the ad-men, a
form of individual self expression. It is rather a form of merchan-
dising subject to limitations for public purposes like other business
practices.... [The advertisements in question present no infor-
mation or arguments in favor of smoking which might contribute
to the public debate. 148
Because the cigarette advertisements served only a commercial pur-
pose, the court found that no First Amendment rights would be violated
by a ruling that might have a chilling effect on such commercial adver-
tising. The court then weighed the interests of the broadcasters against
those of the public health that would be served by a balanced view of
cigarette smoking. The court found that the danger was marginal that
even commercial speech would be chilled by the ruling; that even if
speech were inhibited, the social gain would be greater than the loss;
and that the ruling would affirmatively serve to provide information
vital to the decision whether to smoke or not.1 49  For these reasons,
to reply be given to persons specifically attacked by broadcasters. The Court held that
neither the underlying fairness doctrine nor the personal attack regulation was "inconsis-
tent with the First Amendment goal of producing an informed public capable of conduct-
ing its own affairs." Id. at 392. The fairness doctrine as approved in Red Lion was
followed in Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971), an extension
of the Banzhaf principle to the issue of the relationships between big cars, high test gaso-
line, and air pollution.
146. 405 F.2d at 1096.
147. Id. at 1101-02.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1102-03,
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the interests of public health were allowed to prevail over those of the
broadcasters.
In 1971 the commercial -speech distinction was again invoked
to promote public health interests -in Capital Broadcasting Co. v.
Mitchell.150 A three-judge district court for the District of Columbia
denied a petition to enjoin enforcement of a federal law banning all
cigarette advertising in the electronic media.151 The petition was
brought by broadcasters who argued that the act abridged the freedom
of the electronic press to disseminate information about cigarettes.
The court found no First Amendment violation because cigarette
advertising was purely commercial and not entitled to the same protec-
tions as other forms of speech. 15 2 Furthermore, nothing in the act pre-
vented the broadcasters from airing opinions or information about
smoking; it only prevented them from collecting revenue for airing the
commercial messages of others. 5 ' Petitioners also argued that applica-
tion of the advertising ban only to electronic and not to other media con-
stituted an arbitrary and invidious classification. Considering the
public health purpose of a ban on advertisements that encourage people
to smoke, the court found the classification reasonable in light of the
disproportionate influence of the broadcast media on the decisions of
individuals, particularly the young. The court took notice of evidence
that the warnings on cigarette packages had not reduced cigarette con-
sumption and that Congress required stronger measures to protect the
public health. The court found the ban an appropriate means of
effectuating the congressional purpose.
Judge J. Skelly Wright dissented in Capital Broadcasting on two
grounds. First, he found that the public interest would not be served
by the ban: "Whereas the Banzhaf decision had increased the flow of
information by air so that the American people could make an informed
judgment on the hazards of cigarette smoking, the 1969 Act cut off the
flow of information altogether.' 54  Second, Banzhaf had established
150. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), affd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v.
Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
151. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1969).
152. 333 F. Supp. at 584.
153. But cf. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376 (1973); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). See note 129
and accompanying text supra. The court in Capital Broadcasting glossed over the ques-
tion whether the loss of revenues could be debilitating. 333 F. Supp. at 584.
154. 333 F. Supp. at 589. Since the Banzhaf ruling, anti-smoking messages had
been effective in significantly reducing cigarette smoking, and as long as cigarette adver-
tisements were on the air so would be the opposing messages. An agreement among the
cigarette companies to stop advertising would violate antitrust laws, and if individual
companies stopped advertising they would lose their competitive positions. The compa-
nies therefore supported the statutory ban on cigarette advertising, which also effectively
removed unpaid anti-smoking messages from the air, and cigarette consumption again
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that cigarette advertisements implicitly state a position on the issue of
smoking. Judge Wright reasoned that because these advertisements
were deemed to address a matter of public controversy for the purpose
of requiring presentation of the opposing view, they should be deemed
to have the same character for the purpose of receiving First Amend-
ment protection. 155 He concluded that the advertisements were not
purely commercial because of the implicit message, and that therefore
the government should be precluded from suppressing them. The
majority's responses to this argument were that -the Banzhaf opinion
itself had distinguished cigarette advertising from constitutionally pro-
tected speech, and that the scope of the First Amendment is not deter-




A source of frequent litigation involving advertising and public
health has been legislation that forbids advertising by the medical pro-
fessions. The results of the cases have been mixed. Until recently,
courts have been inclined to uphold such advertising bans as reason-
able regulation of matters affecting the public health. Challenges by
consumers, however, have added, a new dimension to the issue, and
recent decisions indicate that such legislation will be subject to increas-
ing judicial scrutiny in the future.
In three cases the Supreme Court has upheld, against other than
First Amendment challenges, several laws prohibiting medical advertis-
ing. In 1935, in Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners,'57
due process, equal protection, and contracts clause challenges were raised
against a statute providing for revocation of the license of any dentist
who engaged in any kind of advertising. In upholding the statute as
increased. Id. at 587-89. Thus, although intended by Congress as a health measure,
the legislation actually hindered the anti-smoking effort. The majority opinion did not
address this factual issue, but approached the case from the perspective of congressional
intent.
155. Id. at 592.
156. Id. at 585. Shortly after affirming this decision, the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the control of the electronic press over noncommercial aspects of its activities.
In Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973),
the Court held that broadcasters were not required by the First Amendment to accept
paid editorial advertisements. In a balance between the First Amendment rights of the
public and those of the broadcasters, the fairness doctrine was found to be sufficient to
keep the public informed; any right-of-access doctrine, requiring that individual members
of the public be permitted to broadcast their particular views, would violate the rights
of the broadcasting stations. Accord, Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC,
515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975), reiterating that "the public has no absolute right to dic-
tate the content of broadcast material." Id. at 402.
157. 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
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a public health measure the Court said: "The legislature was not deal-
ing with traders in commodities, but with . . . a profession . . . de-
manding different standards of conduct from those which are traditional
in the competition of the marketplace."' 158 Twenty years later, in Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.,15 9 the Court upheld a statute
prohibiting solicitation of sales of eyeglasses. In answer to a due process
challenge the Court found the legislation rationally related to the public
health: "We see no constitutional reason why a State may not treat all
who deal with the human eye as members of a profession who should
use no merchandising methods for obtaining customers."1 0 In 1963
another statute forbidding optometrists to advertise withstood attack in
Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners. 6' The New Mexico
statute was enforced against a Texas optometrist who advertised on a
New Mexico radio station that broadcast into Texas. The Court upheld
the law as a health measure against the charge that it was an unconsti-
tutional burden on interstate commerce.
62
In 1975, however, in Bigelow v. Virginia, 63 the Court was
presented with a First Amendment challenge to a Virginia statute pro-
hibiting the advertisement of abortions.' 64 Bigelow, as managing
editor of a newspaper, published an advertisement for abortion referral,
information, and counseling available at a for-profit agency in New
York, where abortion laws were more liberal than in Virginia. 65 Bige-
158. Id. at 612. Accord, Levine v. State Bd. of Registration, 121 N.J.L. 193, 1 A.2d
876 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (price advertising by dentists).
159. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
160. Id. at 490. When eyeglasses were being sold as mere articles of merchandise,
state courts have invalidated statutes barring advertisement of their prices. Ritholz v.
Detroit, 308 Mich. 258, 13 N.W.2d 283 (1944); State ex rel. Booth v. Beck Jewelry En-
terprises, Inc., 220 Ind. 276, 41 N.E.2d 622 (1942). The courts found no public health
justification for the statutes, which were therefore judged by due process principles and
found to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
161. 374 U.S. 424 (1963). The Court did not reach the First Amendment argu-
ment because it was not properly raised. The First Amendment argument was, however,
properly raised against a prohibition of advertising by optometrists in Ullom v. Boehm,
392 Pa. 643, 142 A.2d 19 (1958), and the statute withstood the challenge.
162. For other Supreme Court decisions resting on the state interest in regulating
professions concerned with the public health, see North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973) (upholding statutory requirement that
majority of stock in pharmacy corporation be held by pharmacists), and Barksy v. Board
of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (upholding statute under which the license of a physi-
cian was suspended for failure to comply with a congressional subpoena).
163. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
164. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960), as amended, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76.1
(1975), provided: "If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale
or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner, encourage or prompt the pro-
curing of abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." The amend-
ment made the statute applicable only to illegal abortions.
165. New York later adopted a statute prohibiting such advertisement by for-profit
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low was convicted under the statute and the Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that the advertisement was a commercial advertise-
ment and could be prohibited, particularly since it related to matters
of health. While an appeal to the United States Supreme Court was
pending, the Court decided Roe v. Wade' 6
6 and Doe v. Bolton,6 7
which established that abortion decisions involve constitutionally pro-
tected rights of privacy and limited the extent to which states may pro-
hibit abortions. Bigelow was then remanded to the Virginia court for
reconsideration in light of Roe and Doe."' The conviction was again
affirmed and again appealed to the Supreme Court, which then consid-
ered the First Amendment issue involved.
The Court first noted that speech involving sales or solicitations
is not necessarily commercial, as established in the religious solicitation
cases,169 and that payment for publishing the advertisement is equally
inconclusive, as established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.70 The
Court also stated that Chrestensen did not stand for the proposition that
all advertising is without any constitutional protection. The Court then
distinguished Pittsburgh Press,17  emphasizing that employment dis-
crimination was illegal in Pittsburgh and discriminatory employment
advertisements published in Pittsburgh indicated an intent to engage
in discriminatory employment practices in Pittsburgh. In Bigelow, on
the other hand, the advertisements were published in Virginia, but the
abortions were available in New York, where they were legal'172 The
referral services. The statute was upheld in S.P.S. Consultants, Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 333
F. Supp. 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), on the ground that it did not prohibit dissemination
of information. For-profit agencies could provide lists of available physicians and facili-
ties, but such lists could not be so selective as to constitute a referral or recommendation.
The purpose of the restriction was to prevent fee-splitting and other unprofessional prac-
tices. After noting that non-profit services like Planned Parenthood were allowed to
provide referrals, the court upheld the classification as not violative of equal protection:
"The state, in exercising its police power in the field of medicine, may ban commercial
practices which it believes violate its public policy." Id. at 1376. The court found that
non-profit organizations were not subject to the same commercial pressures that might
influence for-profit services. Id. at 1379.
166. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
167. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
168. Bigelow v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 909 (1973).
169. E.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). See text accompanying
notes 47-55 supra.
170. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
171. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
172. But cf. Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. '424 (1963). The
Court left open the question whether Virginia would be able to prohibit an advertisement
in Virginia for an activity in New York that was illegal in New York, giving as an ex-
ample the sale of narcotics. 421 U.S. at 828 n.14. A more interesting example of the
question suggested by Bigelow, taken together with the facts of Pittsburgh Press, is
whether the city of Pittsburgh could prevent the publication of an advertisement placed
in the Pittsburgh Press by an employment agency in a state where employment discrimi-
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Court also found "important differences" between the two advertise-
ments: the one in Pittsburgh Press was purely commercial but the one
in Bigelow was not; the latter "did more than simply propose a commer-
cial transaction. It contained factual material of clear 'public interest.'
Portions of its message. . . involve the exercise of the freedom of com-
municating information and disseminating opinion.
'17 3
Having concluded that the advertisement had other than a purely
commercial purpose, the Court then turned to a balancing of the
conflicting interests involved. The state asserted an interest in protect-
ing women from the unethical practices of for-profit abortion referral
services.' 7 4  The Court found that the quality of medical services in
Virginia was not affected by activities in New York, and that Virginia
had no power to regulate the agency in New York or its advertising.
nation is legal, offering employment in that other state, and stipulating that no women
(or minorities) need apply. The Court in Pittsburgh Press said that the advertisements
promoted an illegal activity as much as if they had said "Narcotics for Sale" or "Prosti-
tutes Wanted." 413 U.S. at 388. Unless some factor other than the legality or illegality
of the activity in the state where it is being offered distinguishes Pittsburgh Press from
Bigelow, then if the prostitutes were wanted in Nevada and the advertisement were pub-
lished in Virginia, it would be protected; and if the narcotics were legal in the place
where they were being sold, the advertisement would be protected.
173. 421 U.S. at 822. A federal district court two years earlier had also distin-
guished abortion advertisements from commercial speech. Associated Students v. Attor-
ney General, 368 F. Supp. 11 (C.D. Cal. 1973). The court invalidated a statute prohibit-
ing the mailing of unsolicited abortion information and birth control advertisements,
finding the speech noncommercial: "Plaintiffs have no financial stake in the distribution
of the pamphlet; the mailing was free. Nor do plaintiffs have any demonstrable interest
in the family planning aids and techniques which are objectively analyzed and evaluated
within the pamphlet." Id. at 24. In a similar vein, Hiett v. United States, 415 F.2d
664 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970), invalidated 18 U.S.C. § 1714
(1964), which prohibited use of the mails to distribute material giving information and
soliciting business in connection with the procurement of divorces in foreign countries.
The court found that although "divorce information does not rise to the same dignity
as political expression that affects 'governing' rights," nevertheless "information on mat-
ters of social importance, especially those relating to the marriage relation, . . . is also
given extensive Constitutional protection." 415 F.2d at 672, citing Griswold v. Connec-
ticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating, as violative of the right of marital privacy,
state statutes forbidding counsel in and use of contraceptive drugs). See also Atlanta
Cooperative News Project v. United States Postal Serv., 350 F. Supp. 234 (N.D. Ga.
1972) (invalidating federal postal statute to the extent that it rendered abortion informa-
tion nonmailable); Mitchell Family Planning, Inc. v. City of Royal Oak, 335 F. Supp.
738 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (ordinance banning abortion advertising overbroad as not distin-
guishing between legal and illegal abortions).
174. 421 U.S. at 827. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, would have given effect to this
legislative interest. He quoted a passage from S.P.S. Consultants, Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 333
F. Supp. 1373, 1378 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), discussing the recent New York legislation re-
stricting advertising by for-profit agencies: "[C]ertain hospitals give discounts to these
lucrative, profit-making organizations. Thus, at the expense of desperate, frightened
women these agencies are making a huge profit-some, such a huge profit that our Com-
mittee members were actually shocked." 421 U.S. at 833.
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The Court found that the state's only interest was in regulating the
information available to its citizens, an interest entitled to little weight,
so the publisher's interest in disseminating information was given effect.
In so holding, the Court followed the traditional approach to commer-
cial speech and the First Amendment, as evolved from Chrestensen
and later cases.
Although Bigelow thus conforms to the pattern of earlier commer-
cial speech cases,1 75 the Court suggested that a different approach
might be taken. Some special characteristic, other than its commercial
nature, might be found to distinguish commercial expression from fully
protected speech in order to allow regulation of the former. Thus the
Court described the fair housing cases1 7 6 as involving not commercial
speech, but advertising in connection with "an aotivity that the
government was legitimately regulating.1' 77  Banzhaf and Capital
Broadcasting were described as involving not commercial speech, but
the electronic media, whose "unique characteristics . . . make it espe-
cially subject to regulation in the public interest.1 178  And the Court's
opinions upholding bans on medical advertising in Semler, Williamson,
and Head were distinguished as Fourteenth Amendment cases not
inconsistent with Bigelow. 79 This approach suggested in Bigelow was
followed a year later in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council,8 0 in which the Supreme Court held that
First Amendment protections extended to commercial expression.
IV. Virginia Citizens and Beyond
Virginia Citizens involved a consumer group challenge to a
Virginia statute prohibiting, as unprofessional conduct, the advertise-
ment by pharmacists of prescription drug prices.' 1" Similar statutes
have been challenged in a number of states and most have been invall-
175. See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra. This conformity with earlier cases
is demonstrated by the Court's finding that the crucial difference between the advertise-
ments in Pittsburgh Press and that in Bigelow was that the former were "classic examples
of commercial speech," while the latter "conveyed information of potential interest and
value to a diverse audience." 421 U.S. at 821-22. The Bigelow advertisement was
simply not purely commercial speech, just as the advertisements for religious books were
found not to be commercial speech in Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
176. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972). See text accompanying notes 111-21 supra.
177. 421 U.S. at 825 n.10.
178. Id., quoting Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584
(D.D.C. 1971), affd,405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
179. 421 U.S. at 825 n.10.
180. 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
181. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974).
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dated,18 2 although some have been upheld.'" 3  The First Amendment
was not a significant issue for any of the state courts that considered
such statutes; rather, they concerned themselves with the merits of pub-
lic health arguments advanced by states to justify the prohibition.
Many of these arguments were also reviewed in abbreviated form by
the Supreme Court in Virginia Citizens, and they provide the setting
for that decision.
A. Public Health Considerations
Five major arguments have been advanced in support of bans on
prescription drug price advertising by pharmacists. First, it has been
argued, the state has an interest in preventing improper competitive
practices that lower the standards of service among professions serving
the p'ublic health.'" 4 The answer to this argument has been that regu-
lation of professional practices can, more effectively than prohibition
of advertising, maintain both high standards of service and truthful
advertising; moreover, while promotional advertising by pharmacists
might be used to distort the quality of service, a price list is merely
informative.' 85 Second, states have argued, if customers were able to
compare prices they might not patronize a single druggist, who could
monitor prescriptions to insure that a customer was not taking antago-
nistic drugs.' 86 But the practice of monitoring is infrequent and ineffec-
tive and can better be performed by the prescribing physician.'1
7
Third, in order to offer competitive prices pharmacists might take
advantage of quantity discounts and then allow the drugs to remain too
182. Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy Y. Say-A-Lot, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 311 A.2d 242
(1973); Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 272 A.2d 487
(1971); Florida Bd. of Pharmacy v. Webb's City, Inc., 219 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1969); Stad-
nik v. Shell's City, Inc., 140 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1962).
183. Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969); Super-
markets General Corp. v. Sills, 93 NJ. Super. 326, 225 A.2d 728 (Ch. 1966). In both
of these cases a First Amendment argument was raised, but the statutes were upheld.
184. Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Say-A-Lot, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 109, 311 A.2d
242, 246 (1973); Supermarkets General Corp. v. Sills, 93 NJ. Super. 326, 338, 225 A.2d
728, 735 (Ch. 1966).
185. Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Say-A-Lot, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 113-15, 311 A.2d
242, 248-49 (1973). The court also pointed out that the practice of pharmacy had
evolved from a professional service into a retail business, so that the dignity of the prac-
tice would not be demeaned by price advertising. Id. at 116, 311 A.2d at 249.
186. Id. at 109, 311 A.2d at 246; Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor,
441 Pa. 186, 193, 272 A.2d 487, 491 (1971); Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F.
Supp. 821, 824 (W.D. Va. 1969); Supermarkets General Corp. v. Sills, 93 N.J. Super.
326, 341, 225 A.2d 728, 736 (Ch. 1966).
187. Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Say-A-Lot, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 111-12, 311 A.2d
242, 247 (1973); Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 196-97,
272 A.2d 487, 493 (1971).
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long on the shelf and to deteriorate. 88 But this health hazard can be
prevented by direct regulation rather than by the indirect means of
advertising bans.8 9  Fourth, patients wanting to take advantage of
quantity discounts might put pressure on physicians to write prescriptions
for large quantities.19 0 But the physician, not the consumer, makes the
decision about quantity, and physicians are constrained by professional
ethics not to bow to pressures from patients.' Finally, a related argu-
ment offered by the states is that advertising might create an excessive
demand for prescription drugs and result in drug abuse.' 92  The
counter-argument is that price advertising bans apply only to drugs that
cannot be obtained without a doctor's prescription, so that although
advertising might increase demand, increased prescriptions and use will
not necessarily follow, and regulatory schemes can prevent any drug
abuse that might result from a heightened public demand for drugs.'9 3
Moreover, it has been argued in opposition to advertising bans that
beyond the failure of such bans to serve any public interest, they injure
the public by denying information to consumers who pay inflated
prices for the drugs they need. 9 4
Most of these arguments and counter-arguments were mentioned
briefly by the Supreme Court in Virginia Citizens,19 5 and the Court con-
cluded that close regulation would prevent the impairment of high pro-
fessional standards by price advertising. 96  But the Court also noted
that similar arguments in support of similar statutes had previously per-
suaded the Court to uphold medical advertising bans challenged by due
188. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 193, 272 A.2d 487,
491 (1971); Supermarkets General Corp. v. Sills, 93 N.J. Super. 326, 342, 225 A.2d 728,
737 (Ch. 1966).
189. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 197, 272 A.2d 487,
494 (1971).
190. Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Say-A-Lot, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 109, 311 A.2d
242, 246 (1973).
191. Id. at 116-17, 311 A.2d at 250.
192. Id. at 109, 311 A.2d at 246; Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor,
441 Pa. 186, 193, 272 A.2d 487, 491 (1971); Stadnik v. Shell's City, Inc., 140 So. 2d
871, 873 (Fla. 1962).
193. Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Say-A-Lot, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 110, 311 A.2d
242, 246 (1973); Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 193-95,
272 A.2d 487, 492 (1971); Stadnik v. Shell's City, Inc., 140 So. 2d 871, 875 (Fla. 1962).
Stadnik, which involved an administrative regulation, was held to be controlling in
Florida Bd. of Pharmacy v. Webb's City, Inc., 219 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1969), which invali-
dated a statute similar to the regulation.
194. But for this final point, the Pennsylvania court would have upheld the prohibi-
tion in spite of the weakness of each argument offered in its support. Pennsylvania
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 197-98, 272 A.2d 487, 494 (1971).
195. 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1828 (1976).
196. Id. at 1829.
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process and equal protection arguments.'1 7  These arguments were
not, however, sufficient to justify the ban in Virginia Citizens, where
the challenge was based on the First Amendment.
B. First Amendment Considerations
The statute invalidated in Virginia Citizens had been attacked on
First Amendment grounds in two federal courts in Virginia. In 1969
the statute was upheld in Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery.19 8  A drug
company seeking to enjoin enforcement of the statute argued that it
abridged the freedom of speech. The court for the Western District
of Virginia rejected the petition on the ground that "regulation of com-
mercial advertising does not intrude upon First Amendment rights of
free speech."'1 9  The court found that since the dispensing of drugs
affects the public health, the state was justified in regulating the prac-
tices of druggists. The decision of the Western District was not
appealed.
A court for the Eastern District of Virginia invalidated the same
statute five years later in Virginia Citizens Consumer Council v. State
Board of Pharmacy.200 This time the action was brought by consumers,
who asserted a constitutional right to receive information, theorizing
that "the First Amendment assures its freedoms to the auditor and
and reader as stoutly as it does the speaker and writer." 201  They
argued that the absence of information on drug prices results in con-
sumers paying higher prices than necessary 2 ' and has a detrimental
rather than beneficial effect on the public health. The pharmacy board
argued that commercial expression was not constitutionally protected
and that drug price advertising was commercial expression. The court
first distinguished the holding in Patterson Drug, pointing out that the
challengers there were sellers of drugs, with a necessarily commercial
interest in the advertising. The challengers in Virginia Citizens, on the
other hand, were consumers, and "their concern is fundamentally
deeper than a trade consideration. While it touches commerce closely,
the overriding worry is the hindrance to a means for preserving health
197. Id., citing Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Semler v. Oregon State
Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935). See notes 157-162 and accompanying
text supra.
198. 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969).
199. Id. at 825.
200. 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974), affd, 96 . Ct. 1817 (1976).
201. 373 F. Supp. at 685. For an analysis of this ovolving constitutional theory,
see Comment, The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Con-
stitutional Considerations, 63 GEo. L.J 775 (1975).
202. Among the price discrepancies noted by the court, the same amount of one
drug at different pharmacies ranged in cost from $1.20 to $9.00. 373 F. Supp. at 685.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
or even saving life."2 03  The court also distinguished the earlier
Supreme Court opinions upholding similar statutes - °4 on the ground
that the advertisements prohibited in those cases were of a promotional
rather than informational variety. In Virginia Citizens, the advertise-
ments sought to be permitted were not purely commercial, but contrib-
uted to the dissemination of information. After balancing the public
interest in the advertising against the state's asserted purpose in pro-
hibiting it, the court concluded that the consumers did have a First
Amendment right to the information. That decision was affirmed on
appeal, but the Supreme Court's reasoning was different from that of
the district court.
The Supreme Court first addressed the question whether First
Amendment protections can be claimed by those who seek to receive
information, "and not solely, if at all, by the advertisers themselves who
seek to disseminate that information."20 5  In so framing the question,
the Court apparently foreclosed the approach taken by the district
court, that the right to receive can be asserted when there is no
independent right of expression.20 6 Thus, after reviewing the leading
cases suggesting that the First Amendment grants an implied right to
receive,207 the Supreme Court stated: "If there is a right to advertise,
there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising, and it may be
asserted by these appellees."
208
The Supreme Court also differed from the district court in the
First Amendment treatment of drug price advertising. While the
latter had concluded that such advertising was not commercial speech
because of its informational value to consumers and was therefore
entitled to First Amendment protection, the Supreme Court concluded
that it was commercial speech but was nevertheless protected by the
First Amendment. The Court, began with a brief review of the treat-
ment of commercial speech since Chrestensen and cited several
criticisms of that case. 20 9  The Court also discussed Bigelow v.
203. Id. at 686.
204. Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Williamson v.
Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of
Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
205. 96 S. Ct. at 1823 (emphasis added).
206. That is, the district court had invalidated the statute not because druggists had
a right to advertise, but because consumers had a right to know. The Supreme Court
indicated that the right to advertise must be established before the right to receive can
be asserted.
207. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753 (1972); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
208. 96 S. Ct. at 1823 (emphasis added).
209. Id. at 1823-24, citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959)
(Douglas, j., concurring); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 n.6
(1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting in an opinion joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and
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Virginia,210 in which "the notion of unprotected 'commercial speech'
all but passed from the scene,"-211 but in which the advertisement was
not purely commercial because it conveyed information of public inter-
est about a constitutionally protected activity. Rigelow, then, had not
discarded the commercial speech distinction, but rather had followed
it. In Virginia Citizens, on the other hand, the Court concluded that
drug price advertisements did no more than propose a commercial
transaction and were therefore purely commercial speech.2 12  Thus
squarely presented with the question whether such "purely commer-
cial" expression was entitled to First Amendment protection, the Court
decided that it was.213
In holding that the First Amendment protects drug price advertis-
ing, the Court first cited a number of labor cases for the proposition
that a purely economic interest in speech does not remove protection
from the speaker.21 4 The Court then discussed the consumer's interest
in commercial information, which may be greater than his interest in
traditionally protected political expression, and the importance to
society of certain commercial advertisements that convey information
of public interest. 1 5 Finally, the Court concluded that "no line . . .
could ever be drawn ' 21 6 which would protect commercial advertising
only if it were of public interest and importance, since all advertising
disseminates information necessary to a free enterprise economy. In
light of the First Amendment protections thus granted by the Court to
commercial advertising, the state's public health arguments217 were
inadequate to justify the ban on drug price advertising by pharmacists.
C. Commercial Speech After Virginia Citizens
The Court in Virginia Citizens did not limit its holding to the par-
ticular facts before it, but it did mention certain forms of commercial
speech regulation that were still permissible. However, present law in
other areas of commercial speech regulation, not mentioned by the
Court, may be affected by the decision.
Powell); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
393 (1973) (Burger, J., dissenting); id. at 398 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 401
(Stewart, J., dissenting); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 904-06 (1971)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
210. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
211. 96 S. Ct. at 1824.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1826.
214. Id., citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.$. 575 (1969); NLRB v. Vir-
ginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
215. 96 S. Ct. at 1826-27.
216. Id. at 1827.
217. See text accompanying notes 184-97 supra.
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First, the Court pointed out, the issue in Virginia Citizens did
not involve time, place, and manner restrictions applicable to all
communications, regardless of content.2"' But the Court left open the
question whether the facts in Chrestensen, or in Breard v. Alexan-
dria,21 9 would now lead to the holdings reached in those cases. For
in Chrestensen and Breard restrictions on the time, place, and manner
of communications with a commercial purpose were upheld, while
identical restrictions were invalidated when applied to communications
involving religious or political matters. 220  Thus a householder's right
of privacy, which was protected in Breard, may now weigh less heavily
with the courts than the interests of advertisers, just as it has previously
weighed less heavily than the interests of religious advocates. More-
over, the Court in Virginia Citizens stated that all advertising, "however
tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemi-
nation of information,""22 so that the right of unwilling recipients
to privacy from intrusions upon their senses222 may no longer be pro-
tected by the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech.
Second, the Court noted that false or deceptive advertising was
not in issue in Virginia Citizens and that states were not prevented from
regulating commercial expression to insure its truth."23 Moreover, the
Court indicated that in this context a distinction might continue to be
made on the basis of "commonsense differences" between commercial
and noncommercial speech:
Even if the differences do not justify the conclusion that commer-
cial speech is valueless, and thus subject to complete suppression by
the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of pro-
tection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate
commercial information is unimpaired. 224
The Court mentioned two of these differences. First, the advertiser
can more easily verify the truth of commercial speech than, for
example, a news reporter or political commentator can verify the sub-
stance of his communications. Second, commercial advertising is not
as likely as noncommercial speech to be chilled by regulation. These
218. 96 S. Ct. at 1830.
219. 341 U.S. 622 (1951). See text accompanying notes 58-66 supra.
220. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S.
413 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). See text accompanying notes 42-
57 supra.
221. 96 S. Ct. at 1827.
222. See text accompanying notes 82-90 supra.
223. 96 S. Ct. at 1830-31. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion expands upon this
statement by the majority to emphasize that false or misleading commercial speech is
not protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 1832-35.
224. Id. at 1830 n.24.
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differences permit the requirement of complete accuracy in commercial
statements and the tolerance of less accuracy in statements made with-
out a commercial purpose. Thus, the distinction may still be made in
the area of defamation, so that the First Amendment will continue to
protect the speaker without a commercial motive who is negligent, as
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,225 but may not protect the negli-
gent disseminator of false commercial speech.2 26  Prior restraints, too,
may be allowed in a commercial context, but not in the context of politi-
cal speech, news reporting, and other traditionally protected speech.
22 7
Third, the Court pointed out that the advertisements considered
in Virginia Citizens did not involve transactions that were themselves
illegal, and thus distinguished the case from Pittsburgh Press228 and
United States v. Hunter,220 in which sexually or racially discriminatory
advertisements were at issue.28 The Court thus indicated that a dis-
tinction might still be drawn between commercial and noncommercial
speech in order to promote equal protection in a commercial context,
as well as to protect the public from other illegal activities.2 3' The
Court did not, however, mention speech that does not itself promote
discrimination, but that might result in conditions that perpetuate segre-
gation, such as "For Sale" signs in transitional neighborhoods,3 2 or
representations to white homeowners that nonwhites are moving into
the neighborhood. 33  In Bigelow, though, the Court had noted that
such commercial expression involved an "activity that the government
was legitimately regulating, 2 3' and this characterization might remain
a valid one after Virginia Citizens.
Finally, the Court observed that "the special problems of the elec-
225. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See notes 92-97 and accompanying text supra.
226. See, e.g., Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 898 (1971); see text accompanying notes 103-09 supra. See also SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005
(1971) (liability imposed for mere negligence in preparing a news release that violated
securities regulations).
227. 96 S. Ct. at 1830-31 n.24.
228. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
229. 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
230. See text accompanying notes 111-36 supra.
231. The Court did not mention Bigelow in its discussion of commercial speech pro-
moting illegal activities, so the question remains open whether a state may prohibit the
advertisement of an activity that is illegal in that state, but legal where it is to take place.
See note 172 supra.
232. Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'g 354
F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Ind. 1973). See also Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro,
535 F.2d 786 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3345 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1976).
233. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973).
234. 421 U.S. 809, 825 n.10 (1975).
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tronic broadcast media' ' 35 were not involved in Virginia Citizens, sug-
gesting that it might still be acceptable for the FCC to distinguish
between commercial and noncommercial speech, and to regulate the
former more closely than the latter. It appears, then, that at least when
only the electronic media are affected, commercial advertising may con-
tinue to be regulated in the interests of public health and welfare. 236
If some other medium of communication is involved, however, those
interests may have to be subordinated to the First Amendment protec-
tions now accorded to commercial advertising.
Virginia Citizens expressly left intact several of the areas in which
the commercial speech distinction has previously protected other inter-
ests over the free expression of advertisers and other disseminators of
commercial matter. The right to one's reputation, one aspect of
privacy, may still be protected from negligence in commercial publica-
tions, even if not in publications of other kinds; and freedom from dis-
crimination may still be advanced by regulation of commercial expres-
sion, even though regulation of noncommercial discriminatory expres-
sion is clearly repugnant to the First Amendment. And the public
health and welfare may still be protected by laws that prevent the
imposition on the public of false or misleading advertisements, or
advertisements, at least in the electronic media, for products inimical
to the public health.
The major interest previously protected by the commercial speech
distinction and now susceptible to re-evaluation is the right to be left
alone. None of the ways in which the Court distinguished Virginia
Citizens from earlier decisions touched on cases involving this aspect
of privacy, and in several early cases the only feature of speech that
allowed its suppression in order to protect privacy was its commercial
nature. It is possible, then, that the right to be left alone will no longer
be protected in favor of the First Amendment rights of advertisers.
Another area left open to re-evaluation is commercial speech
injurious to the public health or welfare, but in places other than the
electronic media. Thus, although the FCC may prohibit cigarette
advertising on television and radio stations, 237 or may require presenta-
tion of the anti-smoking message, 238 it is now open to question whether
a state may prohibit display advertising of tobacco products,239 or
235. 96 S. Ct. at 1831.
236. See text accompanying notes 141-56 supra.
237. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), affd
sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
238. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969).
239. Cf. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932). See text accompanying notes
33-37 and 82-83 supra.
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require a permit to maintain a billboard,2 40 or prohibit street distribu-
tion of commercial advertising matter. 241 The Court, in holding that
speech does not lose its constitutional protection merely because its pur-
pose is purely commercial, has renounced the broadly stated position
taken in Chrestensen, and left open possibilities for much wider appli-
cations of the guarantees embodied in the First Amendment.
V. Conclusion
Until recently, the judicial approach to regulation of commercial
speech had been to determine whether the speech had any purpose
other than the promotion of a commercial transaction. If it did not,
the regulation of it was within legislative discretion. If other interests
were present, these were balanced against the interests to be advanced
by the regulation, and the weightier interests were given protection.242
After Bigelow, and particularly after Virginia Citizens, the ap-
proach is now to begin with the premise that commercial expression
is as protected by the First Amendment as other forms of expression,
and then to inquire into whether there is any overriding social reason
why a particular instance of commercial speech should be regulated or
prohibited. In some circumstances the determination whether the
reason is overriding may take into account the commercial purpose of
the speech, as in the regulation of false advertising, advertising of an
illegal activity, or advertising in the electronic media. Although in
these contexts there may still be a distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech, it is clear now that even purely commercial
expression may no longer be dismissed automatically as undeserving of
the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.
240. Cf. Howard v. State Dept. of Highways, 478 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1973). See
note 35 supra.
241. Cf. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
242. See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
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